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I. INTRODUCTION
Born out of congressional reaction to fraudulent and abusive sales
tactics during the market heydays of the 1920's,' the Securities Act of
*Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A. 1962, University of Illinois; Honours Degree in
Jurisprudence 1964, Oxford University; LL.B. 1966, Yalc University.
1. H.R. RLP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933):
During the post-war decade some 50 billions of new securities were floated in the United
States. Fully half or $25,000,000,000 worth of securities floated during this period have
been proved to be worthless. These cold figures spelled tragedy in the lives of thousands
of individuals who invested their life savings, accumulated after years of effort, in these
worthless securities. The flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was
made possible because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers
in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should be basic
to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise.
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19332 created a process of registration and administrative review of securities offerings
designed to foster full disclosure to potential investors.3 Congress did not seek, however,
to impose this formalized process upon every offering. In particular, the 1933
Act provided a private offering exemption 4 and authorized the Securities and
Exchange Commission to develop further exemptions from registration5 "where
A comprehensive set of materials concerning the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 securities
statutes is contained in J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LECISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANCE ACT OF 1934 (1973).
2. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Star. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §5 77a-
77aa (1982)).
3. Except for securities offerings exempt under the provisions of §§ 3 or 4 of the Securities
Act, a registration statement must be filed prior to any offer to sell a security and be declared
"in effect" prior to any sale of the security. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982). Disclosure requirements
for a registration statement are set forth in Schedule A of the Act and are augmented by SEC
regulation.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982) (registration requirement not applicable to "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering"). The provision was originally contained in 5 4(1).
The 1964 revisions to the Securities Act moved the private offering exemption into 5 4(2). Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 12, 78 Stat. 565, 580.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982):
The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations, and subject to such
terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class of securities to the
securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement of this
subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for
the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character
of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted under this subsection
where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds $5,000,000.
The exemption ceiling in the original Act was $100,000. See infa note 48. The "Commission"
referred to in the statute as enacted was the Federal Trade Commission. Administrative powers
and duties were transferred to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created by, and
pursuant to, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Star. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1982)).
The SEC has promulgated several exemptions pursuant to its § 3(b) authority. Current ex-
emptions are found in Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. SS 230.251-.264 (1985), providing a modified
form of registration for offerings up to $1,500,000, see infra note 18, and Regulation D, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.501-.506 (1985), setting forth conditions for exempt offerings under Rule 504 (up to $500,000)
and Rule 505 (up to $5,000,000), see infra note 51 & text accompanying notes 51-54. Regulation
B, 17 C.F.R. 55 230.300-.346 (1985), exempts from registration offerings of fractional undivided
interests in oil and gas rights not in excess of $250,000. The exemption requires certain minimum
ownership interests of the operating lessee, 17 C.F.R. § 230.302(b), and .the pre-filing with the
SEC of an offering sheet containing specified information, 17 C.F.R. § 230.310.
Registration exemption is also provided in S 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act for intrastate offerings.
15 U.S.C. 5 77c(a)(11) (1982).
Any security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within
a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and
doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such
State or Territory.
Id. The exemption is particularly valuable for small companies which are able to raise all of their
capital from local investors, as there are no limitations on the amount offered or the nature and
number of offerees or purchasers. The advantages of the intrastate exemption, however, have not
led to its common use. The exemption is lost for even a de minimis failure to meet the strict
requirements of § 3(a)(11) or the safe harbor Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. S 230.147 (1985). The presence
of one out-of-state offeree or purchaser may defeat the exemption, a particularly harsh result where
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there is no practical need for its application or where the public benefits are
too remote."1
6
Exemptions from the costly and time-consuming processes of securities reg-
istration are essential for many small companies seeking equity capital. 7 Leg-
islative recognition and reaction to the burdens placed on small companies was
reflected most recently in the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980.1
Yet, despite the statutory promise of relief, exemptions have been saddled with
judicial and administrative prerequisites that substantially impair achievement
of the legislative goal. 9 Each of the conditions may have an element of merit,
"residency" is often an ambiguous concept. There is no good faith defense for reasonable mistake.
The exemption might also be lost if a significant portion of the proceeds are used for out-of-state
purposes. See, e.g., SEC v. McDonald Inv. Co., 343 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn. 1972). Even if all
conditions for an intrastate offering were met at the time of sale, the exemption could be retroactively
lost upon resales made to out-of-state residents, a matter over which the issuer may have little
control.
6. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
7. Expenses incurred in the typical registration of securities by small or developing com-
panies, utilizing the Form S-18 created for such purpose, commonly involve a minimum of $30,000-
$50,000. See infra note 17. Moreover, the review process through the SEC will generally take a
minimum of several months for unseasoned issuers. Factors contributing to a longer review process
include: the number and severity of SEC comments in its "deficiency letters"; the type and amount
of additional information required; the possibility of further audits to update financial information;
and the effort needed to redraft and reprint amended materials. Unseasoned issuers frequently go
through several amending processes before the SEC declares the registration statement effective.
See Schneider, Manko & Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REv.
1 (1981).
8. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275.
Legislative concern for the ability of small companies to raise capital under existing securities laws
and regulations was noted in H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
The 1980 Small Business Act added S 4(6) to the 1933 Act as another exemption from
registration. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 5 602, 94
Stat. 2275, 2294 (amending 15 U.S.C. S 77d). More significantly for small issuers, Congress raised
the ceiling for S 3(b) exemptions from $2,000,000 to $5,000,000. Id. § 301, 94 Stat. at 2291
(amending 15 U.S.C. 77c(b)). The 5 4(6) exemption is applicable to offers or sales solely to
accredited investors in an aggregate not exceeding $5,000,000. Accredited investors are defined
principally in terms of institutional or financial requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1985). The
lack of access of small companies to such investors substantially limits the value of this statutory
exemption.
9. Conditions, not necessarily uniform among the various exemptions, include: numerical
limitations on the number of purchasers, see Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§
230.505 & 230.506 (1985); qualitative standards for the sophistication of either or both offerees
and purchasers, see infra text accompanying notes 39-41 and 60-61; written disclosure documents
requiring the filing and SEC review of a prescribed offering statement, see Regulation A, 17 C.F.R.
SS 230.251-.264 (1985); and limitations on the resale of securities purchased through exempt of-
ferings, see Rule 502(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1985). For discussion of the difficulties of small
companies raising capital under exempt provisions, see generally: Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC
Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 622 (1974); Brooks, Small Business Financing Alternatives Under the Securities Act
of 1933, 13 U.C.D.L. REv. 544 (1980); Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act
of 1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE LJ. 1139; Coles, Has Securities Law
Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a Deterrent to Capital Growth: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ.
L. REv. 395 (1975).
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but in combination they constitute a considerable barrier to simplified and
inexpensive methods of capital formation.
This article examines one of those conditions, the prohibition against general
solicitation and advertising applicable to both private and small offering ex-
emptions.'" The prohibition has a long history, but its impact upon small com-
panies and broker-dealers deserves greater attention and analysis than the SEC
has thus far accorded. This article suggests that the statutory objective under-
lying the limited offering exemptions has been undermined by the rigid for-
mulation and application of the general solicitation prohibition by the SEC and,
to a lesser extent, by the courts.
Consider the following, rather ordinary circumstances:
a) An office supply business needs capital to support growing inventory
and to acquire additional showroom space. The business needs are estimated
at $300,000, an amount well beyond the collective capabilities of its several
principals and the company's borrowing power. The business considers a stock
offering. Family and friends both within and outside the state are prepared to
invest $100,000. The remainder will be raised through solicitation of customers
and other persons in the community. Counsel for the principals has been asked
whether the locally-based $200,000 offering presents any problems under the
securities laws."
b) A local promoter concludes that his city would prosper from a con-
vention center. The city government cannot fit the project into its budget, but
10. Rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. S 230.502(c) (1985):
(c) Limitation on Manner of Offering
Except as provided in S 230.504(bXl), neither the issuer nor any person acting on its
behalf shall offer or sell the securities by any form of general solicitation or general ad-
vertising, including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any news-
paper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio; and
(2) Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by any general so-
licitation or general advertising.
Rule 502(c) applies to all Regulation D exemptions, that is, Rules 504, 505, and 506. 17 C.F.R.
%5 230.501-.506 (1985); see infra notes 51-52. The exception in Rule 504(b)(1) concerns the delivery
of a disclosure statement pursuant to registration of the offering under state law. &e infra notes
52 & 55. In addition to the administrative rule, judicial restraints on solicitation and advertising
apply to the private offering exemption of S 4(2) and are based principally on a concern for the
identity and sophistication of offerees. See infra text accompanying notes 62-68.
11. This article examines exclusively the federal private and small offering exemptions. There
is a wide spectrum of analogous provisions among state securities laws, including differing ap-
proaches to the question of investor solicitation. The Florida statute, for example, exempts from
state registration the sale of securities to no more than 35 purchasers in a twelve-month period
provided, among other conditions, that there is no "general solicitation or general advertising in
this state." FLA. STAT. § 517.061(1 1)(a)(2) (1985). Minnesota limits its exemption to 25 purchasers
(35 if sales are made in compliance with Regulation D) but imposes no limitation on general
solicitation or advertising. MINN. STAT. ANN. S 80A.15.2(h) (West Supp. 1986). Moreover, ad-
ministrative standards may vary among states concerning what constitutes general solicitation or
general advertising. See, e.g., Smith, State 'Blue-Sky' Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 MiCH. L.
REv. 1135, 1144 (1936) (noting the diversity among states whether a newspaper prospectus or
advertisement constituted a "public offering").
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the promoter sees potential in a privately-financed venture. He can arrange for
substantial loans, but the lenders are insisting upon a minimum $1,500,000
equity investment. The promoter has talked to several motel owners who are
enthusiastic about the project. His out-of-state sister has pledged $500,000. To
raise the balance, the promoter plans to write a letter to each of the 50 hotel
and motel owners in his town briefly describing the proposed investment. He
will provide a complete disclosure statement to any owner who shows interest.
The promoter wants to know whether his limited offering will fit within the
"private placement" exemption. '2
c) A broker-dealer was the "best efforts" underwriter six months ago for
an $8,000,000 real estate limited partnership private placement. Each purchaser
was carefully screened for suitability and sophistication, and the number of
investors was kept well within the numerical limits for private placements. A
well-crafted, complete disclosure statement was given to each potential investor,
and all appropriate notifications were filed with the SEC.'" The real estate
project has fallen victim to unforeseeable engineering problems and the investors,
looking to get their money back, consider a lawsuit. The firm's attorney learns
that during the offering the firm had placed a small advertisement in a real
estate trade journal describing in general terms the nature and availability of
the investment. The ad, however, fell on deaf ears: no inquiries or potential
investors developed as a result. While the client cannot imagine a problem
stemming from a non-productive, one-time advertisement, counsel fears oth-
erwise.
Each of the above scenarios involves an effort to raise capital other than
through the federal registration process. But for a single factor, each might
qualify for a private or small offering exemption.' 4 The Achilles heel in each
instance is the judicial and administrative position denying registration exemp-
tions for offerings that include "general solicitation or general advertising."'
To generate the $200,000 in the first scenario, the company may need to attract
12. The terms "private placement" and "private offer" used in this article refer to the offer
and sale of securities pursuant to either the S 4(2) exemption in the 1933 Act or the provisions
of the SEC's Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. S 230.506 (1985), setting forth safe harbor conditions for S
4(2) compliance. The terms are distinguished from the small offering exemptions of Rules 504 and
505 created by the SEC pursuant to its § 3(b) rulemaking authority.
13. An offering pursuant to Rule 506, unlike a § 4(2) offering, requires filing with the
Commission of periodic sales results. 17 C.F.R. 9 230.503 (1985). The filing is made on Form
D, requiring information on the issuer's capital and financial status, number and types (accredited
or non-accredited) of investors, offering prices, selling expenses and proposed or actual use of
proceeds.
14. Focus in these hypotheticals is on the S 4(2) and S 3(b) exemptions. Integration consid-
erations prevent reliance in the first two instances on the intrastate offering exemption, 5 3(a)(11)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77c(a)(11) (1982), and the SEC's Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. S 230.147
(1985). See supra note 5. It is also assumed that the intrastate offering conditions were not met in
the third scenario, which sought exemption through Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. S 230.506 (1985). The
S 4(6) exemption is also assumed inapplicable on the basis that one or more of the offerees or
purchasers in the hypotheticals was not an "accredited investor." See supra note 8.
15. See supra note 10; in fra text accompanying notes 55-58.
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a large number of potentially small investors, using a combination of group
meetings, local announcements and brochures. The second hypothetical involves
a proposed mailing to a select group, with some recipients not personally known
by the promoter. The third illustrates a carefully controlled sales program jeop-
ardized by a single, harmless advertisement. In each case, no amount of good
faith, disclosure or caution will prevent the denial or loss of a registration
exemption if the issuer or underwriter has violated the prohibition against gen-
eral solicitation.
The above hypotheticals are not unusual fabrications. Lawyers representing
the multitude of small and medium-sized companies are more likely to encounter
such dilemmas than the much more notorious takeovers and multi-state offerings
that dominate the business journals. Statistics, although limited, indicate that
substantial capital raising activities at local levels fail to conform to exemption
requirements either because of issuer ignorance or deliberate disregard of sta-
tutory provisions.", The economics of the first hypothetical, for example, make
federal registration impractical, 7 even under the modified requirements of Reg-
ulation A.'" If, as appears, the company must disseminate information on its
16. A 1984 SEC study reported 7,222 Form D filings for the period April, 1982, through
April, 1983. DIRECTORATE OF ECON. & POL'Y ANALYSIS, SEC, AN ANALYSIS OF RECULATION D
(1984). Of the $15.5 billion securities sales reported, approximately 80% claimed a Rule 506
exemption (17 C.F.R. S 230.506). Only 3% of the total dollar volume was reported under the
Rule 504 exemption (17 C.F.R. S 230.504), representing 25% of all Regulation D offerings (486
out of 2,002 offerings). For many small companies, Rule 506 is difficult to utilize unless one or
more large investors are able to keep the total number of investors within the 35 numerical lim-
itation. The relatively low use of the Rule 504 exemption suggests that Rule 504 has not proven
useful for small companies seeking equity in the $100,000 to $500,000 range. As of 1981 there
were over 2.5 million active corporations with assets below $1 million, comprising approximately
90% of all active corporations. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 523 (1985). The relatively low number of reported Rule 504
offerings is not likely to reflect actual securities activities, given on-going capital raising requirements
of small companies. See Warren, A Review of Regulation D: 7he Present Exemption Regimen for Limited
Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 355, 359 (1984) ("scant evidence exists
to indicate that Regulation D has fostered increased utilization of the SEC's limited offering ex-
emptions or the raising of capital at reduced regulatory costs"). For concerns recently expressed
on behalf of small real estate syndications with regard to the solicitation limitations imposed in
Regulation D, see infra note 72.
17. See Schneider, Manko & Kant, supra note 7, at 29-31. A recent SEC study of expenses
involved in public offerings utilizing Form S-18, the form developed for smaller issuers, indicated
average expenses of approximately 16% of the total offering. DIRECTORATE OF ECON. & POL'Y
ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 44. Thus, a $400,000 offering would incur legal, accounting and other
expenses of $64,000. The bulk of these expenses are often in sales commissions, as small companies
frequently must offer substantial inducement to broker-dealers to help distribute the issue. The
overall 16% figure was contrasted with the average expense figure of 4.5% of the total offering
for Rule 504 offerings. Id. at 40.
18. Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. SS 230.251-.264 (1985) (adopted by the Commission pursuant
to S 3(b) of the 1933 Act). The exemption is a modified form of registration, as it permits offerings
up to $1,500,000 through the use of an offering statement filed with, and reviewed by, the SEC's
regional office in the issuer's region. Regulation A has not proven to be a popular technique for
capital raising. In 1978, the SEC noted a steady decline over a six-year period in the number of
Regulation A registrations, dropping from 998 in 1972 to 158 in 1977. SEC Securities Act Release
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stock offering, it has little alternative but to ask the inevitable question: what
is the risk if the "solicitation" crosses the ambiguous line of being "general"?
Small, developing companies are severely handicapped by the non-solicitation
rules in two ways. First, if the company abides by the strict non-solicitation
standard, it may well fail to locate enough potential investors to raise the
necessary capital or the effort may be doomed by the consequent slowness of
its pace. Second, if the narrow non-solicitation bounds are breached, even in
good faith, no amount of full disclosure or investor sophistication will save the
offering from the strict liability provisions of the 1933 Act.' 9
The solicitation prohibition is encountered in each of the section 4(2) private
offering and section 3(b) small placement exemptions. Although similar in con-
tent and application, the source of the limitation is primarily judicial, with
respect to section 4(2), and administrative with respect to section 3(b). Courts
have consistently regarded broad-based approaches to large groups of offerees
as antithetical to the section 4(2) concept of a "private offering.' '" On the
other hand, a company that seeks to utilize the small offering provisions of
Regulation D is subject to SEC Rule 502(c).2 ' This non-solicitation rule is not
statutorily mandated. Presumably it stems from the Commission's judgment of
what is necessary for investor protection. Undoubtedly the Commission was
influenced by judicial and administrative conditions affecting the section 4(2)
exemption. However, the Commission appears to have given little or no thought
to the distinctions in congressional purpose between offerings pursuant to section
4(2) and offerings pursuant to section 3(b) rulemaking authority.2
This article proposes that the current prohibitions against solicitation and
advertising applicable to private placements and small offerings:
(i) are neither necessary to assure investor protection nor appropriate as
a mandatory condition governing the availability of a registration exemption;
(ii) impose hardships for small companies and broker-dealers without com-
mensurate benefits to the investing public;
No. 33-5977, 43 Fed. Reg. 41,383, at 41,384 (1978). In 1978 the ceiling for Regulation A offerings
was increased to $I,500,000, see infra note 49, resulting in an increase in filings to approximately
400 in 1980. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6274, 46 Fed. Reg. 2631 (1980). Issuers will
often prefer either the lower cost, less formal methods permitted under the private placement or
other § 3(b) exemptions or, if an SEC disclosure document is to be drafted, undertaking a full-
scale registration statement. Many states provide an exemption from registration for offers of se-
curities for which a federal registration statement is pending, see, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I 10A,
$ 402(b)(12) (Michie/Law Coop. 1985), and for a simpler process of registration of securities for
sale, see, e.g., MICH. Coup. LAws ANN. § 451.703 (West Supp. 1986) (registration by coordination).
19. Failure to comply with the provisions of a statutory or regulatory exemption leads inev-
itably to violation of the registration statement and prospectus requirements of § 5 of the 1933
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77(e) (1982). Section 12(1) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 771 (1982), provides civil
remedies of rescission or damages for purchasers of stock sold in violation of § 5, there being no
good faith or other mitigating defenses. Civil liability under § 12(1) may be imposed against
participants, including broker-dealers, instrumental in the sales process. Lewis v. Walston & Co.,
487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680
(5th Cir. 1971).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 62-68.
21. See supra note 10.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
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(iii) create traps that may unfairly punish not only inadvertence but also
good faith conduct by issuers and broker-dealers; and
(iv) are inconsistent with legislative goals of facilitating the financing abil-
ities of small companies within appropriate bounds of the securities laws.
The preferred method of resolving the expressed concerns is to revise existing
administrative regulations. Failing that, courts should undertake a case-by-case
review of exemption conditions, giving proper weight to appropriate policy con-
siderations.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT STANDARDS
A. Transactions Not Involving a Public Offering - Section 4(2)
Limitations on general solicitation originate in the "offering" language of
the 1933 Act. The terse language of section 4(2) exempting from registration
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering" provides little
significant guidance as to intended coverage. Resort to other sections of the
Act is necessary. In section 2(3), "offer" is defined to include "every attempt
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy" a security for value.'
Although the ambiguity of these definitional terms may support broad inter-
pretation, it is not readily apparent that the Act sought to impose significant
restraints on communication for offerings of a small or non-public nature.
Legislative history of the 1933 Act reflects a primary concern with the broad-
based dissemination of securities. The House bill exempted "issuer transactions
not through underwriters." '2 4 During debate, the phrase "and not involving any
public offering" was added as a clarifying amendment.2 " The Senate bill ex-
23. 15 U.S.C. S 77b(3) (1982): "The term 'offer to sell', 'offer for sale', or 'offer' shall
include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security, for value."
24. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 4 (1933) (as introduced by Mr. Rayburn May 3,
1933):
The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to any of the following transactions:
(1) Transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer; trans-
actions by an issuer not with or through an underwriter; or transactions by a
dealer (not acting as an underwriter), except transactions within one year after
the last date upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the
issuer or by or through an underwriter (excluding in the computation of such year
any time during which a stop order issued under section 8 is in effect as to the
security), and except transactions as to securities constituting the whole or a part
of an unsold allotment to or subscription by such dealer as a participant in the
distribution of such securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter.
25. 77 CoNG. REc. 2954 (1933) (statement of Mr. Rayburn). As passed by the House, the
exemption provision read "transactions by an issuer not with or through an underwriter and not
involving any public offering." H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. S 4(1) (1933). The House Com-
mittee Report noted:
[This provision] exempts transactions by an issuer unless made by or through an under-
writer so as to permit an issuer to make a specific or an isolated sale of its securities to
a particular person, but insisting that if a sale of the issuer's securities should be made
generally to the public that that transaction shall come within the purview of the act.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1933).
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empted "[i]solated transactions . . . not being made in the course of repeated
and successive transactions of a like character.' " After conference, the Act
passed in substantially the form it had taken in the House.2 7 Upon adoption
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 2 however, the phrase "not with
or through an underwriter" was deleted from section 4(1)29 of the 1933 Act in
response to a House report describing the phrase as "really superfluous. ' "'
Given the scant legislative history of the private offering provision, it would
be unreasonable to argue that the legislation has created a firmly defined public-
private distinction. State court interpretations of "public offering" with respect
to then-current state statutes were too diverse to provide meaningful guidance'.3
What seems apparent, however, is that the original emphasis on underwritten
offerings, coupled with the statutory exemption for intrastate offerings and the
delegation to the Commission of the power to exempt offerings up to $100,000,
suggests legislative concern principally with substantial, broadly based selling
efforts. '
Early interpretations of the private offering exemption emphasized the need
to examine all the circumstances underlying the offering. The first administrative
opinion, issued in response to a growing dogma in the securities industry that
offerings to less than 25 persons were not "public," stated that "the deter-
mination of what constitutes a public offering is essentially a question of fact,
in which all surrounding circumstances are of moment. ' "" One of the four
enumerated circumstances requiring examination was the manner of offering. 14
The SEC's General Counsel noted that transactions involving direct negotiation
26. S. 875, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 12(c) (1933). The Senate bill contained generous advertising
provisions for all securities offerings. Id. 5 8. The eventual adoption of the House bill eliminated
advertising for all but registered offerings. See infra note 121.
27. Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 with H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1933). Neither the House nor Senate conference reports commented on the difference between the
bills regarding exemptions for issuer transactions. See 77 CONG. REC. 3891 (1933) (House report);
id. at 3879 (Senate report).
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. SS 78a-78jj (1982)).
29. Id. S 203(a), 48 Stat. at 906.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
31. See Smith, supra note 11; Comment, Corporations - Interpretation of the "Public Offering"
Exemption of the Federal Securities Act and State Blue-Sky Laws, 36 MICH. L. REv. 604, 610 (1938)
("11t does not appear to be necessary, proper or, in fact, feasible to define dogmatically a 'public
offering' as applicable to exceptions under the Federal Securities Act or the blue-sky laws.").
32. "The sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group of
experienced investors, was certainly not a matter of concern to the federal government." Landis,
The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 29, 37 (1959). James
Landis was a principal draftsman of the securities legislation and became chairman of the SEC in
1935.
33. Op. Gen. Counsel, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952, at
10,952 (1946) (released Jan. 24, 1935).
34. Id. The four enumerated factors were: (1) the number of offerees and their relationship
to each other and to the issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size of the offering; and
(4) the manner of offering.
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were more likely private offerings than those involving public distribution."' The
SEC also expressed concern regarding deceptive selling efforts in the guise of
"preliminary" approaches. So-called "preliminary" conversations would be
deemed an "offering" if directed to ascertaining a willingness to accept an offer
that might eventually be made.", The administrative emphasis on the totality
of circumstances was echoed by the first major judicial decision in this area.
In SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines,' the court deliberately avoided technical "public"
versus "private" tests and instead emphasized "the purposes sought to be
achieved by such distinction.'""
In SEC v. Ralston Purina, 9 the Supreme Court departed significantly from
prior efforts to define "public offering." The Court elected not to analyze the
nature or breadth of solicitations, but to emphasize instead the qualitative char-
acteristics of the offerees. According to the Court, a "public offering" was not
determined necessarily by numbers or the method of offering, but rather by a
consideration of whether any of the offerees was the type of potential investor
for whom the registration process was intended.4" Thus, a face-to-face private
negotiation could be a "public offering" if the potential investor did not have
access to, or was not given, registration-type information. 4' If a face-to-face
private negotiation could produce a "public offering," the SEC subsequently
reasoned that a sales effort involving mailings, circulars or advertisements was
a "public offering" a fortiori. Thus the SEC adopted a position after Ralston
35. Id.
36. Id.
I have very serious doubt whether, in many of those cases where it is stated that an
offering is to be made only to an insubstantial number of persons, there may not be
preliminary conversations for the purpose of ascertaining which of various possible pur-
chasers would be willing to accept an offer of the security in question if it were made to
them. Any such preliminary negotiations or conversations with a substantial number of
prospective purchasers would, in my opinion, cause the offering in question to be a public
offering, thereby necessitating prior registration of the security in question.
Id.
37. 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938).
38. Id. at 701. "To determine the distinction between 'public' and 'private' in any particular
context, it is essential to examine the circumstances under which the distinction is sought to be
established and to consider the purposes sought to be achieved by such distinction." Id. The court
found a "public offering" in the corporation's solicitation of loans from its 530 stockholders through
letters offering "shareholder loan receipts." The decision was based on the large number of offerees
and the lack of proof regarding their knowledge about the issuer. See id. at 702. The manner of
offering, through letters to each offeree, did not appear to be a factor in the court's determination.
39. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
40. Id. at 124-25.
The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of infor-
mation thought necessary to informed investment decisions. The natural way to interpret
the private offering exemption is in light of the statutory purpose. Since exempt transactions
are those to which "there is no practical need for [the bill's] application," the applicability
of 5 4(1) should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need the protection
of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a
transaction "not involving any public offering."
41. Id. at 127.
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Purina that public advertising of an offering was not appropriate when claiming
a private offering exemption.4 2 The SEC has maintained this position, with
varying explanatory embellishments, in subsequent rules.
4
'
The Commission's fixed non-solicitation rule was an over-reaction to the
problems raised by Ralston Purina. The Court quoted with approval the Ninth
Circuit's admonition in Sunbeam Gold Mines44 to examine the circumstances and
purposes of the offering in the particular context . 4 The stock offerings in Ralston
Purina involved hundreds of employees scattered throughout the country, many
of whom received low salaries and lacked the ability to obtain meaningful dis-
closures. In such circumstances, the Court found "obvious opportunities for
pressure and imposition." '4" The Court's focus on the particular circumstances
of the offering sharply contrasts with the SEC's elevation of the manner of
offering factor to an inflexible and inviolable standard. Indeed, the Supreme
Court specifically rejected the SEC's attempt in Ralston Purina to promote the
adoption of a strict rule for future application.
47
By administrative fiat, however, the SEC has succeeded in creating an im-
pregnable rule against public solicitation which replaces a judgment based upon
consideration of the circumstances of the case. Moreover, the SEC's blunt treat-
ment permits no distinction among forms of solicitation; non-aggressive cau-
tionary style is considered equally as noxious as the pressurized tactics that
concerned the Court in Ralston Purina. The issue should not be whether the
single factor of general solicitation vitiates a section 4(2) exemption, but rather,
under all of the circumstances, whether the solicitation rose to the level of an
offer, and whether subsequent measures were taken to assure adequate disclosure
and other safeguards prior to completion of the investment decision. Returning
42. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, at 11,316 (1962).
43. See, e.g., id.
Negotiations or conversations with or general solicitations of an unrestricted and un-
related group of prospective purchasers for the purpose of ascertaining who would be willing
to accept an offer of securities is inconsistent with a claim that the transaction does not
involve a public offering even though ultimately there may only be a few knowledgeable
purchasers.
Id. Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. S 230.146 (1981), establishing a safe harbor for 5 4(2) offerings, elaborated
upon the advertising and solicitation prohibitions by listing forbidden forms of communication such
as newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, promotional meetings, letters and circulars. Similar
constraints in varying terms were set forth in Rules 240 and 242. In 1982, Rules 146, 240 and
242 were replaced by the provisions of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1985). See infra
note 51.
44. 95 F.2d at 699.
45. 346 U.S. at 123-24.
46. 346 U.S. at 127.
47. The Commission would have us go one step further and hold that "an offering to
a substantial number of the public" is not exempt under § 4(1).... It may well be that
offerings to a substantial number of persons would rarely be exempt .... But there is
no warrant for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory
interpretation.
Id. at 125. The SEC's argument was directed at the question of numbers rather than manner of
solicitation, but the Court's avoidance of strict categorizations applies equally to each element of
the private offering equation.
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to the standards set in Ralston Purina, the SEC should place its regulator)'
emphasis on achieving the statutory purpose of investor protection.
B. Exemptions in the Public Interest - Section 3(b)
In recent years, Congress and the Commission have responded to concerns
that small or developing companies need relief from the costly registration pro-
vision of the 1933 Act. Congress has raised the monetary limit on the Com-
mission's authority to establish registration exemptions five times .4  The
Commission reacted by increasing the aggregate limits of Regulation A offerings49
and issuing new rules under its expanded authority.""
The pressure for regulatory exemptions culminated in the Commission's
adoption of Regulation D in 1982.' Of particular interest to smaller companies
was the adoption of Rule 504, which exempts from registration securities of-
ferings not greater than $500,000.2 Rule 504 allows developing companies the
48. The S 3(b) exemption limit began at $100,000. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, S 3(b),
48 Stat. 74, 76-77. Congress successively increased the limit to $300,000, Act of May 15, 1945,
ch. 122, 59 Stat. 167; to $500,000, Act of Dec. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-565, 84 Stat. 1480;
to $1,500,000, Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-283, § 18,
92 Stat. 249, 275; to $2,000,000, Act of Oct. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-425, 92 Stat. 962; and
to $5,000,000, Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, S 301, 94
Stat. 2275, 2291 (codified at 15 U.S.C. S 77c(b) (1982)).
49. Maximum offerings under Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1985), were in-
creased periodically following legislative exemption limit increases. &e supra note 48. Recent increases
were to $500,000 in 1971, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5125, 36 Fed. Reg. 1525 (1971),
and to the current $1,500,000 in 1978, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5977, 43 Fed. Reg.
41,383 (1978). There is no currently proposed increase despite the 1980 amendment of S 3(b) to
$5,000,000 in the Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 96-477, S 301, 94 Stat. 2275, 2291. The
limited use of Regulation A by small issuers, see supra note 18, has led the Commission to openly
question its continued viability. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6339, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791,
at 41,794 (1981).
50. Rule 240 was adopted in 1975, exempting certain offerings up to $100,000 annually by
corporations having less than 100 shareholders. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5560, 40 Fed.
Reg. 6484 (1975), 17 C.F.R. 5 230.240 (1977). Rule 242 was adopted in 1980, exempting issues
up to $2,000,000 in a six-month period sold to accredited persons and to not more than 35 non-
accredited persons. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6180, 45 Fed. Reg. 6362, 6367 (1980), 17
C.F.R. 5 230.242 (1980). Both rules prohibited general solicitation and advertising. Rules 240 and
242 were rescinded in 1982 upon adoption of Regulation D. See infra note 51.
51. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982). Regulation D
consists of Rules 501 through 506, 17 C.F.R. SS 230.501-.506 (1985). Rule 504, which replaced
Rule 240, see supra note 50, permits sales up to $500,000 to an unlimited number of purchasers.
Rule 505, which replaced Rule 242, see supra note 50, permits sales up to $5,000,000 to not more
than 35 purchasers, excluding accredited investors from the numerical limitation. Rule 506, which
replaced Rule 146, see supra note 43, creates a § 4(2) safe harbor for sales to not more than 35
purchasers, also excluding accredited investors.
52. Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. S 230.504 (1985):
(a) Exemption. Offers and sales of securities that satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b)
of this section by an issuer that is not subject to the reporting requirements of section 13
or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and that is not an investment company shall be exempt
from the provisions of section 5 of the Act under section 3(b) of the Act.
(b) Conditions to Be Met - (1) General Conditions. To qualify for exemption under this
section offers and sales must satisfy the terms and conditions of SS 230.501 through 230.503,
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opportunity to raise capital without the expense or delay of federal registration.
In particular, the rule freed such offerings from mandatory detailed disclosure
requirements" and from limitations on the number and level of sophistication
of offerees or purchasers.1
4
Had the SEC imposed no further constraint on Rule 504 offerings, capital
generation by small companies would have been substantially facilitated without
loss of adequate antifraud control. Unfortunately, the SEC subjected Rule 504
and other Regulation D offerings to a strict prohibition against any general
solicitation or advertising. ' By imposing a constraint which simply reiterated
prior regulatory policy, the Commission appeared to give little consideration to
the serious negative effects of the prohibition on developing companies. The
Release proposing adoption of Regulation D only briefly described the limitation
on solicitation. The only justification given for the proposed rule was that its
provisions were similar to those found in Rule 146(c)." Curiously, while the
Release indicated the SEC wanted to act under section 3(b) to alleviate the
burdens placed on small businesses,"7 its perfunctory adoption of a non-solici-
tation rule was drawn from an entirely different statutory context. Ironically,
the prohibition considerably negates the salutary capital generating objectives
otherwise promoted by the regulatory provisions. s
except that the provisions of SS 230.502(c) and (d) shall not apply to offers and sales of
securities under this section that are made exclusively in one or more states each of which
provides for the registration of the securities and requires the delivery of a disclosure
document before sale and that are made in accordance with those state provisions.
(2) Specific Condition.-(i) Limitation on Aggregate Offering Price. The aggregate offering
price for an offering of securities under this S 230.504, as defined in S 230.501(c), shall
not exceed $500,000, less the aggregate offering price for all securities sold within the
twelve months before the start of and during the offering of securities under this section
in reliance on any exemption under section 3(b) of the Act or in violation of section 5(a)
of the Act.
53. Rule 504 offerings require no disclosure or disclosure format. Rule 505 offerings require
disclosure of "the same kind of information as would be required in Part I of Form S-18" except
for financial statements. 17 C.F.R. S 230.502(b)(2)(A) (1985). Rule 506 offerings require disclosure
of the "same kind of information as would be required in Part I of a registration statement,"
except for audited financial statements that cannot be obtained "without unreasonable effort or
expense." Id. S 230.502(b)(2)(B).
54. Both Rule 505 and Rule 506 limit the number of purchasers to 35 unaccredited persons
plus an unlimited number of accredited persons. Rule 506 requires sophistication for non-accredited
purchasers or their representatives. 17 C.F.R. S 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1985) ("such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks
of the prospective investment").
55. 17 C.F.R. S 230.502(c) (1985); see supra note 10. The solicitation prohibitions do not
apply if registration under state securities laws is effected in each state where an offer is made
and no sale is made without delivery of a state-mandated disclosure document. 17 C.F.R. $
230.504(b)(1) (1985). The relief accorded by this provision is of little practical value, as most issuers
that seek exemption from federal registration similarly seek to avoid state registration, since the
latter also entails filing and review of a disclosure document, additional costs, delays and, in some
instances, uncertainties related to the "merit review" standards of state law.
56. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6339, supra note 49, at 41,792.
57. Id. at 41,791-92.
58. In footnote 30 of the release, the Commission "cautioned" issuers that offerings to large
numbers of accredited investors may violate the general solicitation and advertising prohibition. Id.
19861
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In adopting Regulation D, the Commission was mindful of existing limi-
tations on sales efforts by issuers. Significantly, Rule 506 abandoned "offeree"
concerns. 9 Former Rule 146, influenced by the "offeree" emphasis of section
4(2) litigation, required sophistication of both offerees and purchasers.'" By
shifting the focus in Rule 506 entirely to purchasers, the SEC moved to a
damnum sine injuria position. Thus, the private offering exemption is not lost
simply because there happens to be a non-sophisticated offeree who does not
purchase the security."' If this moderation of rules was designed to avoid burdens
on capital-raising where investor protection is unnecessary, it is difficult to
understand why the strict rule against advertising or solicitation could not sim-
ilarly be relaxed where other safeguards assure that investor interests have been
satisfied.
The solicitation and advertising prohibitions for private and small offerings
could have included safe harbor guidelines permitting limited preliminary con-
tact between issuers or broker-dealers and potential investors. The terms "offer,"
"offeree," and "solicitation" could have been defined to exclude limited forms
of communication. Neither the courts nor the Commission have chosen this
course, perhaps fearing inability to control solicitation efforts. In view of the
problems caused by existing policy limitations and the valid concerns of small
issuers and broker-dealers, re-evaluation of judicial and administrative action is
appropriate.
III. CREATING THE POOL OF POTENTIAL INVESTORS
A. Judicial and Administrative Limitations
The solicitation decisions of the courts and the Commission evidence a marked
consistency. Since the emphasis on offeree protection in Ralston Purina , no
offerings have been exempted from registration requirements when there was
a hint of solicitation extending beyond the narrow confines of identified, knowl-
edgeable investors. In Henderson v. Hayden Stone, Inc. ,"' the Fifth Circuit permitted
at 41,799 n.30. This is a regulation with a vengeance, as the overall thrust of the Regulation D
provisions is to permit accredited investors to fend for themselves. Offerings limited to accredited
investors, for example, do not invoke the particular disclosure requirements of Rules 505 and 506.
17 C.F.R. S 230.502(b)(1)(i) (1985). The Commission did not repeat note 30 or its cautionary
language in the release adopting Regulation D, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, supra
note 51, but its position has remained constant that general solicitation must be avoided regardless
of the nature of the recipients.
59. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, supra note 51, at 11,352.
60. Rule 146(d), 17 C.F.R. 5 230.146(d) (1981).
61. The pragmatic shift from offeree to purchaser concerns is nullified and the exemption
lost if the Rule 502(c) prohibition on general solicitation is violated. Thus, the existence of non-
purchasing offerees may continue to disqualify the Rule 506 exemption. This illustrates a primary
fault of Rule 502(c); it applies even in situations of non-productive solicitations, thus raising potential
liability for the broker-dealer in scenario three. See supra text accompanying note 13.
62. 346 U.S. at 119.
63. 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. XXXVIII
SECURITIES MARKETS FOR SMALL ISSUERS
an admittedly sophisticated investor 4 to rescind his transaction because the
defendants could not establish the identity of each of the other persons who
might have received an offer. The court reasoned that since solicitation might
have extended to non-qualified offerees, even plaintiffs purchase was not exempt
from registration requirements."5 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held invalid a
company's solicitation limited to its customers, stressing the possible lack of
financial sophistication of the offerees."
Meticulous controls and recordkeeping as to each offeree helped sustain a
Rule 146 private placement in Mary S. Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments. 6 7 This
decision provides little comfort to small companies, however, because the issuer
relied extensively on a major brokerage firm contacting its knowledgeable and
wealthy investor clientele."8 Companies without access to such broker-dealers,
whether because of size or risk of the offering, are more likely to begin their
search for investors within a broader pool that may unintentionally include
persons of limited financial experience.
Relief from the tight constraints of the non-solicitation rules might be avail-
able if courts construed "offer" and "solicitation of an offer" in a manner
analgous to, although not identical with, their meaning in contract law."9 Thus,
an "offer" for securities law purposes might be limited to circumstances where
the "offeree" could accept and create a binding commitment without further
action by either party.7" Such a standard, however, would not provide sufficient
64. "Mr. Henderson can only be described as a sophisticated investor." Id. at 1071.
65. Id. at 1071-72; accord Doran v. Petroleum Mgt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977);
SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
66. SEC v. Tax Serv., Inc., 357 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1966). The issuer, a publisher of tax
materials, sought to offer shares to the approximately 800 purchasers or subscribers of its publi-
cations. The offer was subsequently extended to certain attorneys who were neither purchasers nor
subscribers. The court made no distinction between the groups of offerees, concluding: "The mere
fact that the offerecs were attorneys or subscribers ... has no bearing on the critical question
respecting the offerecs' access to the kind of information which would be made available to them
by registration." Id. at 144; see also SEC No-Action Letter, Mineral Lands Research & Mktg.
Corp., available Dec. 4, 1985.
67. 642 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1981).
68. Id. at 102. The court was also influenced by the fact that none of the offerees was
determined except by examination of responses to an offeree questionnaire setting forth information
as to net worth and financial sophistication. "These offeree questionaires [sic] were reviewed by
Mr. Gary [vice-president of the issuer], and only those persons to whom he was willing to sell
were given offers." Id. at 103. The court's apparent willingness to distinguish between initial contact
and "offer" was not essential to its holding. See infra note 71.
69. The contract law analogy was rejected in Feitler v. Midas Assoc., 418 F. Supp. 735
(E.D. Wis. 1976), construing similar statutory language in the Wisconsin Uniform Securities Law.
See also SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. Wash. 1940) ("Indication of Possible
Acceptance" signed by potential investors held an offer under the 1933 Act).
70. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNT cTs § 11 (1963) (footnote omitted):
What kind of act creates a power of acceptance and is therefore an offer?... It must
be an act that leads the offeree reasonably to believe that a power to create a contract is
conferred upon him .... It is on this ground that we must exclude invitations to deal or
acts of mere preliminary negotiation .... So long as it is reasonably apparent that some
further act of the offeror is necessary, the offeree has no power to create contractual relations
by an act of his own, and there is as yet no operative offer.
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protection against puffery and misleading statements occurring in the prelimi-
nary, "non-offering" phase. Therefore, analogy to the contract standard would
be appropriate only where the initial communication makes it abundantly clear
that the potential investor cannot purchase the security without receiving further
disclosure of material terms. Unfortunately, confining the statutory terms in
such manner has been a road not taken.
Except for several relatively ambiguous references,7 ' case law does not dis-
tinguish between preliminary contacts and offers. The Commission, however,
has addressed this issue aggressively. A proposed advertisement by an issuer,
which made no reference to specific securities and asked only that readers who
"want to find out more" make written inquiry, was regarded by the SEC as
an improper "first step" in the offer and sale of securities. 72 Similarly, an
institutional advertisement by a syndicator of limited partnerships, which made
no reference to a specific offering and asked readers to call or write for more
information, was regarded by the SEC as "an offer even at a time when
securities are not being sold if the syndicator expects in the near future to offer
and sell securities.' '7 A tombstone advertisement 74 indicating completion of a
Accord I S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS S 27 (3d ed. 1957) (footnote
omitted):
Frequently negotiations for a contract are begun between parties by general expressions
of willingness to enter into a bargain upon stated terms and yet the natural construction
of the words and conduct of the parties is rather that they are inviting offers, or suggesting
the terms of a possible future bargain, than making positive offers.
71. In SEC v. Freeman, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,361 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 3, 1978), defendants sought to establish a 9 4(2) private offering exemption despite the
use of newspaper advertisements that "equity positions" were available. In denying summary judg-
ment to the defendants, the court noted: "This apparent pattern of soliciting offerees from among
the public casts grave doubt on the claim that all offerees were qualified, even if the advertising of
'equity positions' is not itself considered to be an offer." Id. at 93,243 (emphasis added). A similar
distinction between communication and an offering was indicated in Mary S. Krech Trust v. Lakes
Apts., 642 F.2d at 98. A private offering exemption was permitted on the basis of a questionnaire
filled out by interested investors who were subsequently made offers based upon the qualifying
information so disclosed. Id. at 102-03. Neither of these cases analyzed whether or to what extent
preliminary communications might differ from the "offer" concept of the 1933 Act.
72. SEC No-Action Letter, Damson Oil Corp., available July 5, 1974, [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,916. The difficulties of smaller real estate syndications in
reaching prospective investors was noted in a March 1986 letter from the Real Estate Securities
and Syndication Institute to the SEC. 18 SEC. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 17, at 590 (Apr. 25,
1986). The letter suggested that Regulation D issuers should be able to engage in "generic business
advertising" provided there is no mention of any specific transaction or investment currently avail-
able.
73. SEC No-Action Letter, Gerald F. Gerstenfeld, available Dec. 3, 1985, reported in 17 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 2193 (Dec. 20, 1985). Even an institutional advertisement not
inviting further inquiry was given only guarded SEC approval. SEC No-Action Letter, ENI Corp.,
available Dec. 3, 1975.
As you recognize, such advertisements may attract individual private investors as well
as issuers. The question whether such a response will entail the offer or sale of securities
to particular investors in a manner prohibited by Rule 146(c) remains a factual question
which will be governed by the special facts and circumstances of each situation.
Id. at 2.
74. A "tombstone advertisement" is the securities industry's term for the limited form of
[Vol. XXXVIII
SECURITIES MARKETS FOR SMALL ISSUERS
particular private placement was approved only on the condition that the ad-
vertisement would not enhance any current or contemplated offerings.
75
The judicial and administrative responses to the "offering" concept provide
little room for maneuvering by companies or broker-dealers who do not have
ready access to large lists of qualified investors. Current limitations permit
potential investors to be contacted through general interest inquiries, provided
such contacts are made considerably prior to the commencement of an offering.
7
'
Such planning activity is much more likely to be undertaken by well-established
broker-dealers than by small companies. 77 Once an offering is contemplated or
begun, solicitations become limited to persons with whom the issuer or broker
has pre-existing business relationships. 7
The SEC's response to the 1977 Borden no-action request illustrates the
breadth of its position. 79 During the pendency of a Rule 146 offering, the issuer
planned to enlarge its list of qualified offerees by mailing offering circulars to
its known list of offerees and asking the recipients to compile a list of additional
qualified offerees. The issuer would then decide whether it was appropriate to
send offering materials to additional persons so listed. Despite the fact that
solicitation was to be limited to qualified offerees as defined by Rule 146(d),
the SEC determined that the mailing would violate the solicitation provisions
public announcement permitted prior to or during a registered offering pursuant to Rule 134, 17
C.F.R. S 230.134 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
75. SEC No-Action Letter, Alma Securities, available Oct. 2, 1982.
76. SEC No-Action Letter, Arthur M. Borden, Esq., available Oct. 6, 1978.
77. Broker-dealers and syndicators whose businesses involve a fairly regular stream of private
placement offerings may, through advance planning, alleviate the strictures of the non-solicitation
rules by developing lists of potential, pre-deared investors obtained through general interest inquiries
and questionnaires. The SEC conditions approval of solicitation from such lists on such persons
not being subjected to any securities offering in progress or contemplated at the time of initial
contact and information-gathering. SEC No-Action Letter, Bateman Eichler, available Dec. 3, 1985,
reported in 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 2193-94 (Dec. 20, 1985).
78. SEC No-Action Letter, Woodtrails-Seattle, Ltd., available Aug. 9, 1982, [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,342. The proposed sale of limited partnership interests
under Rule 505 was to be made by written offer to approximately 330 persons who had previously
invested in other limited partnerships sponsored by the general partner over a three-year period.
Both the inquiry and staff reply pointed out that the issuer believed each of the proposed offerees
was knowledgeable in business matters and capable of evaluating the risks of the proposed in-
vestment. Id. at 78,285. All of the issuer's prior offerings had been pursuant to Rule 146, for
which the sophistication standard was required. Rule 505, however, does not contain a similar
requirement. It is unclear why the issuer and the SEC believed it appropriate to point out the
sophistication of the offerees unless sophistication is a necessary element for permissible solicitation
along with a pre-existing business relationship. If that is the SEC's position, offers under Rule
505 may be made to anyone, but written communications that amount to "general solicitation"
may be made only to sophisticated investors with a prior relationship to the offeror. The SEC
supported this position in two recent no-action letters. These staff replies stressed that the estab-
lishment of a prior relationship is satisfied only if the broker-dealer or issuer receives sufficient
information from the potential investor to evaluate the individual's sophistication and financial
circumstances. SEC No-Action Letter, E.F. Hutton & Co., available Dec. 3, 1985; SEC No-Action
Letter, Bateman Eichler, supra note 77; see infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
79. SEC No-Action Letter, Arthur M. Borden, Esq., available Sept. 15, 1977, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,344.
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of Rule 146(c)." The result created a major setback to efforts by companies
and brokers seeking to identify potential offerees once an offering was underway.
As an alternative to focusing on the "offering" concept, the SEC could also
have chosen to examine the sophistication and knowledge of the solicited po-
tential investors. Private offering litigation has often dealt with the issue of
whether particular offerees need the protection of the Act. Additionally, section
3(b) speaks in terms of public interest and the necessity of investor protection.
Yet, offeree identity is a forgotten, irrelevant factor in the SEC application of
its non-solicitation rules. The SEC has indicated that the non-solicitation rules
apply even to solicitation directed only at accredited investors."* Thus, a news-
letter financed by an issuer and sent only to accredited investors did not pass
Rule 502(c) muster.12 Likewise, limited partnership advertisements directed solely
to potential tenants of a building constituting the partnership's primary asset
also violated Rule 502(c). 83 Advertisements directed to the managers of pension
and profit-sharing plans, unquestionably a sophisticated group of potential inves-
tors, received a negative SEC response under its solicitation rules,8 as did an
issuer's intended purchase and use of a list of accredited investors.""
The cumulative effect of administrative responses is to limit solicitation to
a distinct group of sophisticated persons with whom the issuer or broker-dealer
enjoys a pre-existing business relationship. The "pre-existing relationship" qual-
ification has been imposed by the SEC through interpretation of its own rules.
It is questionable whether this significant, substantive modification has been
80. "[A] permitted communication must not only be directed to a qualified offeree but must
also be directed to him in his capacity as offeree, rather than in his capacity as an intermediary
who is asked to locate other qualified offerees." Id. at 88,597.
81. Interpretive Release on Regulation D, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6455, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10,045, 60, at 10,052 (1983). Curiously, former Rule 146(c) permitted exceptions to its
non-solicitation rule for (1) seminars or meetings where each person invited was a qualified offeree
or was accompanied by an offeree representative, and (2) letters or other communication addressed
solely to qualified offerees. 17 C.F.R. S 230.146(c)(2)-(3) (1981). In adopting Regulation D, which
replaced Rule 146, the SEC did not explain why the exceptions were not continued at least for
Rule 506 offerings. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, supra note 51.
82. SEC No-Action Letter, Texas Investor Newsletter, available Jan. 23, 1984. A newsletter
analyzing intrastate private offerings, directed solely to accountants and lawyers in the state of
Louisiana, prepared by attorneys, accountants and an investment adviser, also failed to receive
SEC approval, despite the fact that none of the newsletter participants was affiliated with or an
investor in any of the issuers described. SEC No-Action Letter, Tax Inv. Information Corp.,
available Feb. 7, 1983, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,379. The
staff set forth its reasoning in SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-6455, supra note 81, at 10,052:
"Although Regulation D does not directly prohibit such a third party publication, the staff refused
to agree that such a publication would be permitted under Regulation D because of its susceptibility
to use by participants in an offering." This incomplete explanation fails to delineate the harm or
potential dangers that "use by participants" would entail.
83. SEC No-Action Letter, Randall Dalton, available Dec. 28, 1983.
84. SEC No-Action Letter, Ajax Co., available Jan. 5, 1979.
85. Remarks of Catherine C. McCoy, Associate Director of the SEC's Corporate Finance
Division, at "The SEC Speaks in 1985" conference (Mar. 1, 1985), reported in 17 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 403 (Mar. 8, 1985).
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appropriately adopted through interpretive release, rather than being subjected
to the statutory rulemaking process." '
Case law does not appear as riveted to the requirement of a pre-existing
business relationship, although several decisions upholding private offering ex-
emptions have stressed this factor. In Woodward v. Wright,"7 for example, the
Tenth Circuit in upholding a private offering noted that "the whole transaction
was a closely knit arrangement among friends and acquaintances, and was
conducted on a personal basis."" In Garfield v. Strain,"" the same court again
upheld a private offering and observed that one important factor in the decision
was the "close relationship and past dealings" of the parties.""
In Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp. ,'" however, where the Fifth Circuit
discussed at length the elements of the private offering exemption, the court
made no reference to a pre-existing relationship between the offerees and the
issuer. Rather, the discussion regarding the offeree-issuer relationship dealt solely
with access to information. It was not the pre-existing relationship between the
parties that was critical in private offerings, but rather the impact which the
relationship or lack of relationship had on the disclosure process. 2 The Doran
court's emphasis on disclosure demonstrates an appropriate return to the fun-
damental concern for investor protection rather than reliance upon a relationship
factor that may be irrelevant for investor protection purposes.
The SEC requirement limiting solicitation to a pre-existing business rela-
tionship pool is not only unduly burdensome but suffers from narrow appli-
cation. For example, the SEC is unlikely to find that a sufficient relationship
exists between a company and its principal suppliers and customers, although
such individuals may have a thorough knowledge of the nature of the business
and its financial condition. Thus far the SEC has permitted issuers to solicit
only pre-existing investors."'
If the concern is one of enticement, however, pre-existing knowledge ac-
quired through means other than investment should suffice. Moreover, under
SEC guidelines, even a pre-existing relationship does not permit general solic-
itation unless the relationship provides the broker-dealer or issuer with sufficient
information"4 to determine the offeree's sophistication and financial circumstan-
86. At issue is the extent to which formal rulemaking procedures may be avoided through
administrative interpretation of existing rules. The uncertain yet significant scope of the "pre-
existing relationship" requirment raises such an issue. The author is indebted for this point to
Linda Wertheimer, Esq., of Dallas, Texas, who raised the issue during discussion of Regulation
D at the March 1985 meeting of the Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the
American Bar Association in Los Angeles, California.
87. 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959).
88. Id. at 115.
89. 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963).
90. Id. at 119; accord Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1958)
(purchasers were all long-time friends and associates); Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975
(W.D. Pa. 1951) (offering limited to participants in prior, similar offerings).
91. 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 902-04.
93. SEC No-Action Letter, Woodtrails-Seattle, Ltd., supra note 78.
94. In two recent no-action letters the SEC doubted whether the questionnaires submitted
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ces. Thus, a proposed solicitation of business clients of the issuer's officer raised
Commission concern about possible non-sophistication of the offerees."' Re-
quiring this additional element of sophistication incorporates into small offering
exemptions the section 4(2) concern regarding the identity of offerees. The
merging of section 3(b) and section 4(2) concerns serves only to further inhibit
the congressional purpose of facilitating small company financing.
B. Internal Problems of Rule Interpretation
No less problematic are the two subsections of Rule 502(c) which set forth
examples of forbidden solicitation and advertising. Subsection (1), which pro-
hibits any communication through public media,', relies totally on form rather
than content. Under subsection (1), if the advertisement or notice is arguably
related to a securities offering, then the content of the notice, the recipient,
and other factors pertinent to the fundamental issue of investor protection be-
come irrelevant. Indeed, the breadth of subsection (1) has allowed the SEC to
go so far as to question product advertising occurring prior to or during a
stock offering."7 The provision has also been applied to newsletters describing
private placements distributed by subscription to attorneys and accountants within
a single state which are prepared by third parties not controlled by or affiliated
with the issuers.' While the Commission's vigilance is admirable, it comes at
a very high price. In view of the legitimate needs of small businesses for capital,
and the potential first amendment considerations,"" the SEC seemingly could
have adopted more modest limitations.
for SEC examination would provide sufficient information for the broker-dealer to make the required
evaluation. SEC No-Action Letter, E.F. Hutton & Co., available Dec. 3, 1985; SEC No-Action
Letter, Bateman Eichler, available Dec. 3, 1985. The Bateman Eichler questionnaire sought in-
formation as to investment objectives, income range, net worth, current retirement plans, and
approximate amounts invested historically in various forms of bonds and equities. See 17 SEc. RLE.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 50, at 2193 (Dec. 20, 1985) (noting E.F. Hutton & Co. and Bateman
Eichler letters).
95. SEC No-Action Letter, Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., available Dec. 4, 1985
(proposed offer to approximately 600 clients of insurance broker-officer of the issuer).
96. Rule 502(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. S 230.502(c)(1) (1985) (prohibiting "[a]ny advertisement, ar-
ticle, notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine or similar media or
broadcast over television or radio"); see supra note 10.
97. SEC No-Action Letter, Printing Enters. Mgt. Science, Inc., available Apr. 25, 1983,
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,415. "The question [whether product
promotion is general solicitation under Regulation D] requires an evaluation not only of the content
of the specific advertisements but also of the actual use of each advertisement in relation to the
offering of securities." Id. at 78,517-2.
98. SEC No-Action Letter, Tax Inv. Information Corp., supra note 82. The newsletter was
to be distributed solely through subscriptions to accountants and lawyers in the state of Louisiana.
The analysis in each case would summarize the germane data in the private placement document
and would also attempt to provide information on the background of the promoters, the marketability
of the investment and additional comments pertinent to the economic and tax aspects of the in-
vestment. The SEC staff was "unable to concur" in counsel's opinion that the proposed distribution
would not constitute general solicitation or advertising of the offerings. Id. at 78,394.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 105-12.
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Subsection (2) of Rule 502(c) addresses the problem of seminars and group
meetings. "H Experience supports a genuine concern about slick, pressurized sell-
ing tactics that may occur at such gatherings.'"' However, Rule 502(c) proscribes
such meetings and seminars only when the attendees have been invited by
general solicitation or advertising. The SEC does not object to meetings per
se, but rather to the method of attracting those who attend. This is a curious
and confusing position. Under Rule 502(c), representatives of an issuer may
meet with persons introduced through mutual acquaintances or attracted to the
issuer through means other than general solicitation or advertising. In those
circumstances, the issuer and the potential investor probably will be total
strangers. Moreover, nothing in Rule 502(c) precludes the issuer from meeting
with several persons at a joint meeting. But, should several persons be attracted
to a meeting by reason of a general notice, the forbidden line would be crossed.
Again, the SEC focuses on form only. Two group meetings with strangers,
identical in substance and disclosure, may result in different applications of a
small offering exemption. Fraud unquestionably may occur in group meetings,
but it is the element of disclosure that should concern the SEC, not the form
or manner of gathering.
More troublesome than the breadth and severity of the non-solicitation doc-
trine is its warping of the fundamental objectives of securities laws. The Se-
curities Act seeks to prevent fraud and protect potential investors by requiring
full disclosure of material information. The manner of offering is important in
determining how investors were attracted to the offer and whether the means
create disclosure concerns. Thus, early administrative analysis regarded solici-
tation as one of several elements to consider in determining the availability of
a private offering exemption.' 2
Such a position did not suggest that the manner of offering become a sole,
dispositive criterion. Rather, the manner would constitute one element to be
considered as part of the whole. The SEC's rigidified, inflexible standard now
seen in Rule 502(c)"" left no substance either to the Supreme Court's admo-
100. Rule 502(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. S 230.502(c)(2) (1985) (prohibiting "[any seminar or meeting
whose attendees have been invited by any general solicitation or general advertising"); see supra
note 10.
101. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
The principal design of the meetings is to foster an illusion of affluence. Investors and
Koscot employees are instructed to drive to meetings in expensive cars, preferably Cadillacs,
to dress expensively, and to flaunt large amounts of money. It is intended that prospects
will be galvanized into signing a contract by these ostentations displayed in the evangelical
atmosphere of the meetings.
Id. at 476.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
103. See supra note 10. The proposed Federal Securities Code developed by the American Law
Institute retained a limitation against "general advertising" for limited offerings but, "because the
concept of 'general advertising' is inherently vague," the provision was not a condition of the
exemption. Violation would subject the issuer to "the usual public sanctions," but would not
impose absolute civil liability for rescission or damages as in § 12(1) of the 1933 Act. FEDERAL
SEcURITIS CODE S 227(b) comment 2(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). This compromise position
would also be unsatisfactory, for it would retain without adequate analysis an ambiguous, blanket
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nition to analyze the circumstances of each case," 4 or to the legislative policy
to permit avoidance of the burdens of registration where investor protection
does not otherwise demand. The non-solicitation rules have thus broken loose
from the moorings of the fundamental statutory concerns of disclosure and
prevention of fraud.
C. First Amendment Concerns
In addition to policy concerns, the restraints on communication raise first
amendment questions. While courts have allowed appropriate regulation of com-
mercial speech,"'" the scope of the Commission's non-solicitation rules may prove
too restrictive to survive constitutional scrutiny. The rules create a classic prior
restraint and preclude companies and broker-dealers from informing the public
of even the existence of an offering. This restraint is far more restrictive than
the pre-clearance provisions for proxy""' and registration"7 statements, which
justify prior restraint only on grounds of inadequate disclosure. Rule 502(c),
however, permits no communication falling within the ambiguous range of gen-
eral solicitation or advertising, regardless of content, recipient, effect or intended
result.
Recent cases have expanded the arena of corporate speech", and have de-
limited the SEC's ability to regulate forms of investment advice." 9 In one recent
case regarding proxy regulations, the trial court noted that a constitutional
presumption existed against statutes that paternalistically regulated commercial
prohibition and would continue to subject issuers to the risks of unspecified "public sanctions"
should hazy lines be crossed. Removing the prohibition as a condition of the exemption is appealing,
but a more specific foundation should be created in defining the parameters of solicitation and
advertising.
104. See supra text accompanying note 45.
105. Commercial speech involves "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980). In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Supreme Court refused to
recognize any first amendment protection for such speech, a position it overruled 34 years later
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
In invalidating a state statute prohibiting advertising of prescription drug prices, the Court rejected
the "highly paternalistic" view that government power extends to the control and suppression of
commercial speech. 425 U.S. at 770. In Central Hudson, the Court developed a four-part test to
analyze regulation of commercial speech. The advertisement must not be misleading or deceptive;
the government regulation must promote a substantial government interest; the regulation must
directly advance that interest; and the regulation must be no more extensive than is necessary to
serve the government interest. 447 U.S. at 563-66.
106. 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-9(a) (1985) prohibits proxy solicitation "which, at the time and in
the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading ..
107. See supra note 3.
108. See cases cited supra note 105; First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
109. Lowe v. SEC, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985) (rejecting the SEC's effort to require registration
of a securities newsletter offering investment advice).
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free speech for the "good" of the people.'"' Although none of these cases
provides controlling precedent for an argument that the non-solicitation rules
are constitutionally infirm, the cases reflect developing doctrine that regulation
of commercial speech has its limitations.
Coincidentally, three of the leading Supreme Court decisions invalidating
restraints involved statutory limitations on advertising."' None of the cases
involved securities, a field whose history of abusive tactics seemingly justifies
substantial controls on communication. Despite the historical justification, how-
ever, regulation must directly advance the asserted interest and cannot be more
extensive than necessary to serve that interestY1 If rigid rule application cannot
be based on justifiable investor protection concerns, or if such concerns can be
met by less intrusive means, grounds exist for suspecting the continued validity
of sweeping restraints on communication.
A recent SEC staff response to a no-action letter request by a corporation
proposing to publish an investment newsletter"' illustrates the breadth of the
Commission's impact on commercial communication. The newsletter would have
described closely-held business which expected, in the indefinite future, to be
110. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 625 F. Supp. 221, 226 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 779
F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985). The district court ruled an advertisement critical of the plaintiff's man-
agement published in several New York area newspapers was not a proxy solicitation. Id. The
Second Circuit reversed based in part on the district court's abuse of discretion in limiting discovery
and in part on interpretation of the SEC's proxy solicitation rules. Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1985). The appellate court found it "unnecessary to express
an opinion on any claim of privilege under the First Amendment" pending resolution of the
solicitation issue on remand. Id. at 796.
The SEC proposal to expand the definition of "solicitation" in the proxy context, 17 C.F.R.
S 240.14a-1 (1985), announced in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-22,195, 50 Fed. Reg. 29,409
(1985), has been criticized by American Bar Association representatives on first amendment grounds
for potential stifling of communications between shareholders and management. 18 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 529 (Apr. 11, 1986). The current provision defines solicitation as a
communication "reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a
proxy." 17 C.F.R. 5 240.14a-1(o (iii). The proposed definition adds the phrase "or which rea-
sonably could be expected to affect" such proxy matters. 50 Fed. Reg. at 29,411.
111. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(advertising to promote the use of electricity); Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(posting of real estate "For Sale" signs); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (advertising of prescription drug prices).
112. Central Hudson Gas & Elcc. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66
(1980); see supra note 105. In an article addressing advertising limitations solely in the context of
registered offerings, Michael Schoeman concludes that the Supreme Court's extension of first amend-
ment protection to commercial speech requires a re-examination of governmental regulation of
advertising. Schoeman, The First Amendment and Restrictions on Advertising of Securities Under the Securities
Act of 1933, 41 Bus. LAW. 377, 392 (1986). "In the advertising of securities . . . there is a public
interest in the free flow of information, an interest that is disserved by the restrictions on ad-
vertising." Id.; see also Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372
(1979) (contrasting the informative function of commercial speech, deserving of protection, from
the contractual function, which may be appropriately regulated).
113. SEC No-Action Letter, J.D. Manning, Inc., available Feb. 27, 1986, reported in 18 SEe.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 374 (Mar. 14, 1986).
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raising capital through one or more exempt securities offerings. The newsletter,
to be sent only to subscribers, would focus on companies within a limited
geographic locale.' 4 Companies choosing to be described would pay a fee for
three months of publication, which would set forth in not more than twelve
lines the business, its financial history, and the estimated amount of capital the
company might eventually seek. Each company would submit to the newsletter
a written representation that it was not then offering securities and did not
plan to offer securities during the newsletter's publication period."' The news-
letter would offer no investment advice on any of the described companies.
In denying the newsletter's request for a no-action letter under the general
solicitation provisions of Regulation D, the SEC staff's reply set forth a laundry
list of concerns, including: Rule 502(c) of Regulation D, the "offering" concept
of section 2(3),"" and the "prospectus" rules of section 2(10)."' Yet no ex-
planation or reasoning was provided. " 8 Viewing the proposed newsletter as an
effort to bring potential investment opportunities to the attention of interested
subscribers, and accepting in good faith the assertion that the company de-
scriptions would not run concurrent with securities offerings, and, finally, having
confidence in the capabilities of anti-fraud enforcement should problems of tim-
ing or deception arise, there is little reason, other than pure formalism, to stifle
the proposed communications. Indeed, the market should be encouraging pub-
lication of precisely these kinds of documented and verifiable data. The chilling
effect on newsletters not associated with issuers and not engaged in brokering
114. At first, the geographic limit was to be central and southwest Florida. Id.
115. It is not clear whether the company was required to state that it would not sell any
securities during such period. No doubt the possibility of sales weighed heavier with the SEC staff
than the company's professed intent against offers.
116. See supra note 23.
117. See infta text accompanying notes 121-22. The staff response also hinted that the newsletter
might be considered an underwriter or dealer. A similarly negative SEC reaction to a proposed
investment newsletter is contained in SEC No-Action Letter, Tax Inv. Information Corp., supra
note 82.
The impact of the SEC's strict position is further illustrated in SEC No-Action Letter, Venture
Capital Exchange, available Apr. 23, 1986, reported in 18 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 20,
at 730 (May 16, 1986). A not-for-profit matching service run by the University of Tulsa provided
an introductory match between potential investors and private companies in Oklahoma. The SEC
staff determined that the service did not require registration under either the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. SS 80b-1 to -21 (1982), or the broker-dealer provisions of the 1934 Act.
However, the staff added the cautionary statement that "it appears that your service may raise
an issue under Rule 502(c)," regarding general solicitation by issuers engaged in Regulation D
transactions. Id. That caveat made the otherwise favorable no-action letter less significant. Given
the strictures of SEC interpretation of Rule 502(c), the newsletter may choose not to run the
gauntlet as a potential accessory to a series of 1933 Act registration violations.
118. The entire response on the issues raised stated:
Under these facts it appears that an offer, within the purview of S 2(3) of the Securities
Act, of the participating businesses' securities may be involved, consequently we are unable
to conclude that there would be no general solicitation for purposes of Rule 502(c). For
this same reason, the Company's newsletter could be deemed to be a prospectus as defined
by S 2(10) of the Securities Act.
SEC No-Action Letter, J.D. Manning, Inc., supra note 113.
[Vol. XXXVIII
SECURITIES MARKETS FOR SMALL ISSUERS
activities reduces rather than expands the disclosure opportunities available to
potential investors. No clear commensurate benefits are gained by such restric-
tions. If the disclosures are or tend to be misleading, adequate remedies exist
under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act. SEC
actions which drive potential offering efforts underground lead inevitably to both
an underinformed and an unequally informed investing community.
IV. Room To BREATHE: PROPOSED GROUNDS FOR MODIFICATION
Reformers will seek in vain for clues signaling that either the courts or the
Commission is prepared to loosen significantly the taut reins of the non-solic-
itation rules. Any relaxation which might occur will not be the result of applied
precedent. Reform will come only after recognition that current standards or
interpretations are no longer appropriate. The SEC has, in other contexts,
proven its willingness to undertake a volte-face."" Here, the continued affir-
mation of its position through restrictive interpretations and no-action letters
suggests that no near-term revolution is at hand. Yet, substantial ground for
reconsideration exists. The starting point is recognizing that serious capital rais-
ing problems exist for small companies and their brokers, that costly registration
cannot continue as the short and unsatisfactory answer, that application of strict
and inflexible standards may be inconsistent with the statutory and regulatory
objectives, and that a modification of the solicitation rules can be achieved
without loss of investor protection. Recognition of these premises by the courts
and Commission provides an essential predicate to a reform which will revitalize
the "statutory purpose" rationale of Ralston Purina." Appropriate questions are
the following:
A. Has an Offer or Solicitation Been Made?
Justifiable concern persists over whether potential investors will be unduly
influenced by solicitation methods, the effects of which will not be overcome
later by simple receipt of a disclosure document. The appropriate response,
however, is not a complete ban on solicitation, but rather an analysis of whether
effective controls can be established which preserve both capital financing and
investor interests. The most fundamental response would be to consider whether
any circumstances exist under which approaching or contacting a potential inves-
tor would not be regarded as an "offer" or "solicitation."
Nothing in the securities laws prevents the SEC from establishing reasonable
guidelines to distinguish permissible from impermissible solicitation. The 1933
119. A clear example of the SEC's rejection of its prior position came in the adoption of Rule
145, 17 C.F.R. S 230.145 (1985), reversing its interpretation that certain reorganizations taken
through shareholder vote did not involve the "sale" of securities. SEC Securities Act Release No.
33-5316, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,631, at 23,636 (1972). In rescinding its prior Rule 133 and adopting
Rule 145, the Commission noted: "Administrative agencies as well as courts from time to time
change their interpretation of statutory provisions in light of reexamination, new considerations, or
changing conditions which indicate that earlier interpretations are no longer in keeping with the
statutory objectives." Id. at 23,632.
120. 346 U.S. at 119.
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Act exempts from its definition of "prospectus" advertisements or other com-
munications containing information limited to the identity of the issuer, the
price of the offering, and other matters that may be permitted by the Com-
mission. 2 1 Indeed, the Commission has expanded the list of permitted "tomb-
stone" disclosures to include a brief indication of the issuer's general type of
business. 2
2
Although the statutory provision for such limited advertising applies solely
to registered offerings, the SEC has adopted similar standards for the advertising
of oil and gas offerings exempt from registration under Regulation B.' 2' The
121. 15 U.S.C. S 77b(10) (1982). The Commission's authority under S 2(10), 15 U.S.C. S
77b(10) (1982), to determine the parameters of such limited advertising was added to the Act in
1954. Act of Aug. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 577, 68 Stat. 683. Advertising was not viewed with
alarm by the Senate draftsmen of the 1933 Act. The Senate bill contained express permission for
advertising of any kind of offering, information to include a brief description of the security, its
price, the issuer's assets, liabilities, profits and losses, and a reference to additional information
being contained in the registration statement. S. 875, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. S 8 (1933). Indeed,
the practical concerns of advertising were specifically addressed in § 8(0:
[I]n any case where, by reason of limited size of such written, printed or other graphic
or radio communications, it is impractical to set forth all the foregoing information, there
shall be set forth such parts thereof or such other information as the Commission may by
rules or regulations prescribe ....
The Senate hearings reflected no adverse reaction to the advertising provisions, except comments
from newspapers as to the amount of space the advertising would take. Hearings on S. 875 Before
The Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong., Ist Sess. 251 (1933). The Senate bill was
substantially replaced upon final adoption by the House version, see supra note 27, which restricted
advertising to registered offerings. H.R. REP. No. 5480, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. S 2(10) (1933).
122. 17 C.F.R. S 230.134(a)(3) (1985). The regulation applies only to registered offerings and
must be read in light of the "gun jumping" concerns of the SEC, reflected in SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-3844, 22 Fed. Reg. 8359 (1957):
It follows from the express language and the legislative history of the Securities Act
that an issuer, underwriter or dealer may not legally begin a public offering or initiate a
public sales campaign prior to the filing of a registration statement. It apparently is not
generally understood, however, that the publication of information and statements, and
publicity efforts, generally, made in advance of a proposed financing, although not couched
in terms of an express offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or
arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer in a manner which
raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact part of the selling effort.
Id. at 8359.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 230.318(a) (1985):
Any written advertisement or other written communication, or any radio or television
broadcast, which states from whom an offering sheet meeting the requirements of this
Regulation B (5§ 230.300-230.346) may be obtained and, in addition, contains no more
than the following information, may be published, or broadcast at or after the commence-
ment of the public offering to any person prior to sending or giving such person a copy
of the offering sheet:
(1) The name of the offeror of the interests;
(2) The identity or type of the interests to be offered;
(3) The number of such interests to be offered;
(4) The location (county and state) of the tract or tracts involved;
(5) The price of the interest to be offered; or
(6) The type of well to be drilled, such as an exploratory or developmental well.
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Commission has also sanctioned a controlled form of advertising in response
to the problem of intrastate offerings advertised in newspapers distributed across
state lines.12 4 These advertisements are not regarded as offers to out-of-state
residents if they explicitly restrict offers and sales to residents of the particular
state involved. '12
The securities laws can tolerate a limited form of solicitation and adver-
tisement if carefully controlled. A communication should not be regarded as an
offer, general solicitation, or advertisement if it does no more than provide the
following information: the identity of the issuer, the nature and price of the
security, the aggregate number of securities to be sold, a brief indication of
the issuer's business, the issuer's principal place of business, the method for
obtaining further information, and a statement that no offer or sale of the
security will be made without additional disclosure.'" This limited form of
communication could be regarded as outside the statutory references to "offer"
and "solicitation of an offer," and similarly outside the administrative scope
of the non-solicitation rule. The broad statutory definition of "offer," arguably
extending to any advertisement or circular regarding the sale of securities,'"7
need not be maximized if reasonable interpretation would satisfy the concerns
124. Exemption from registration is accorded intrastate offerings by S 3(a)(1 1) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. s 77c(a)(11) (1982). See supra note 6. The exemption does not permit offers to
out-of-state residents, thus raising the problem of advertisements in regionally distributed news-
papers.
125. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4434, 26 Fed. Reg. 11,896 (1961). Analogous approval
was given in SEC No-Action Letter, Elwill Dev. Ltd., available Aug. 14, 1974, for a newspaper
advertisement of a private placement where the shares were to be sold in a block to a single,
sophisticated purchaser. The SEC conditioned approval on the advertisement stating that (1) the
securities may be sold to only one individual purchaser for his own account and not as a repre-
sentative of purchasers other than himself and (2) the purchaser may not resell the securities publicly
without compliance with the registration provision of the Act.
126. If the Commission were to act by rule, it might consider requiring a statement in bold-
face type, similar to the disclaimer required for tombstone advertisements, that the securities may
not be sold nor may offers to buy be accepted prior to the time that a written disclosure statement
is delivered to the potential investor. Cf. 17 C.F.R. S 230.134(b)(1) (1985) (limited advertising
allowed where registration not yet effective).
127. 15 U.S.C. S 77b(3) (1982). The statutory definition specifically excludes from coverage
"preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer ... and any underwriter." At least
one court has held, under principles of statutory interpretation, that the concept of "offer" was
intended to include preliminary negotiations between an issuer and anyone other than an under-
writer. SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. Wash. 1940). The court's reasoning is
problematic. The exception was not intended to equate all forms of preliminary negotiations with
"offers" or "solicitation of an offer," as the provision could simply have been drafted to include
preliminary negotiations as an explicit form of "offer" or "solicitation." The exception deals with
the common industry practice of negotiations between issuers and underwriters that generally occur
prior to the development of any offering documents. In order to assure that such negotiations,
particularly for firm commitment underwritings, not be burdened with concerns of potential violation
of the registration provisions, a specific exception was inserted. The term "preliminary negotiations"
covers all aspects of bargaining with underwriters up to the moment of commitment, including the
exact price for which the underwriter is willing to purchase the securities. These preliminary ne-
gotiations would be substantially different from initial contacts an issuer might make to determine
the interest of potential investors.
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for investors by permitting carefully limited statements and preliminary con-
tacts.12
In considering section 4(2) private placements, where offeree qualifications
are relevant, the limited communication should include the statement that no
offer to purchase will be made except to those who meet qualification standards
as determined by the issuer. This announcement would further detract from
the characterization of the solicitation as a "public offering" and substantially
limit the impact of an advertisement upon potential investors.
Even if communication goes beyond this narrow, permissible boundary, the
exemption should not be lost as long as the overriding purposes of the securities
law - disclosure and the prevention of fraud - are satisfied. To hold otherwise,
as SEC rules currently do, would elevate harmless technicality over substantive
purpose. Thus, a communication which arguably involves an "offer" should
be examined in light of a second fundamental issue, whether such communi-
cation affronts the statutory purpose of investor protection.
B. Are the Potential Investors Adequately Protected?
If a solicitation crosses the line and becomes an "offer," the impact for
exemption purposes may vary depending upon the nature of the recipients. In
light of the statutory concern for offerees applicable to private offerings, the
private offering and small offering exemptions must be independently evaluated.
1. Section 4(2) Offerees and Rule 506 Purchasers
Statutory emphasis upon "offers" has led to the section 4(2) condition which
precludes solicitations to persons who fail to meet the offeree qualifications of
Ralston Purina. Absent statutory amendment or judicial modification of Ralston
Purina's offeree concerns, 29 solicitations under section 4(2) that amount to "of-
fers" will continue to carry a substantial risk of invalidating the exemption.
Alternatively, private placements utilizing the safe harbor provisions of Rule
506 consider only the sophistication of the purchasers or their designated rep-
resentatives, not the entire group of offerees.'"' Therefore, the means by which
128. A major concern for courts and the SEC involves oral solicitations for which no written
documents have been previously furnished. The anti-solicitation rules reflect appropriate concern
that widespread "hawking" of securities is contrary to the best interests of potential investors. The
limited form of communication proposed in this article is addressed to the written form of com-
munication. Where oral solicitation is used, analogous limitations could well apply. Thus, oral
discussion that stays within the narrow confines of limited description should be tolerated, provided
that no offer is sought or accepted until further and full disclosure has been made. The problems
of proof will be difficult for the company or broker seeking to establish the exemption. If the
solicitation rules were relaxed to permit limited communications as proposed, written communi-
cations may become the preferred form.
129. Schwartz, Rule 146: The Private Offering Exemption - Historical Perspective and Analysis, 35
OHto ST. L.J. 738, 776 (1974). The author argues Ralston Purina should be reinterpreted. He
suggests that the breadth of the offering in that case could readily distinguish, on the basis of
public benefits, the application of the statute in those circumstances from an offering to a much
more limited group of employees.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
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sophisticated and knowledgeable purchasers are attracted to the offer ought not
to be relevant. Furthermore, Rule 506 provides substantial disclosure require-
ments." ' As a result, no readily apparent public interest exists to limit com-
munication in a Rule 506 offering. The continued applicability of Rule 502(c)
to a Rule 506 offering should be re-examined by the Commission.
2. Non-sophisticated Rule 504 and Rule 505 Purchasers
Regulation D provisions should be judged in light of the legislative purpose
to permit exemption where registration "is not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of investors.""' ' While the SEC could theoretically refuse
to create any section 3(b) exemptions, the existence of discretionary power does
not excuse its inappropriate exercise. Viewed against public interest concerns,
Rule 502(c) creates a blanket prohibition which exceeds the reasonable limits
of its statutory base. For offerees who do not become subsequent purchasers,
solicitations may prove to be harmless or may present only limited time and
energy concerns. For offerees who ultimately purchase a security, adequate
statutory and administrative provisions exist to assure investor protection.
The extensive disclosure required for offerings under Rule 5051" should
provide any necessary elaboration or explanation of matters raised in initial
communications. For offerings under Rule 504, the critical question is whether
the overall process of communicating, negotiating and closing a securities trans-
action was done in a manner which provided for a reasoned, knowledgeable
investment decision. While Rule 504 requires no specific disclosure document,
the omnipresent anti-fraud provisions present a powerful incentive for the dis-
closure of material information to potential investors."134 Even assuming that
131. Rule 502(b)(2)(i)(B) requires, for issuers not already subject to the reporting requirements
of the Exchange Act, disclosure to purchasers of "[t]he same kind of information as would be
required in Part I of a registration statement." 17 C.F.R. S 230.502(b)(2)(i)(B) (1985).
132. See supra note 5.
133. For Rule 505 offerings, Rule 502(b)(2)(i)(A) requires that issuers not already subject to
the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act disclose to purchasers "[t]he same kind of infor-
mation as would be required in Part I of Form S-18 (17 C.F.R. S 239.28), except that only the
financial statements for the issuer's most recent fiscal year must be certified by an independent
public or certified accountant." 17 C.F.R. S 230.502(b)(2)(iXA) (1985). The information must also
be furnished to accredited investors if sales are made to both accredited and non-accredited investors.
Id. $ 230.502(b)(1)(ii).
134. The 1933 Act antifraud provisions requiring disclosure of all material information are
specifically applicable to offerings exempt from registration. See S 12(2), 15 U.S.C. S 771 (1982);
S 17(c), 15 U.S.C. S 77q(c) (1982). Section 12(2) remedies in the event of inadequate or misleading
disclosure are either rescission plus interest or damages if the security was sold. The availability
of a private cause of action under S 17 has not been clarified. Compare Kirshner v. United States,
603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978) (implied private right of action exists), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979) with Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (no private right of
action). The Supreme Court has noted the dispute without expressing opinion. &e Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983). Section 17 mirrors the provisions of S
10b of the 1934 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (1982), for which a private right of action was
confirmed in Herman & MacLean. Injunctions may be obtained by the SEC under S 17 of the 1933
Act, and criminal penalties are provided in S 24, 15 U.S.C. S 77x (1982), for willful violation of
the Act or any rules thereunder.
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post-solicitation disclosure will be an ineffective antidote to the influence of initial
communications, no basis exists for concluding that a combination of existing
anti-fraud provisions and modified controls permitting limited communications
would be similarly ineffective.
V. FASHIONING RELIEF
Ideally the Commission will reconsider Rule 502(c) and its interpretations
of the "offering" concept. The non-solicitation rules may be overdue for hear-
ings and commentary. To some extent, the longevity of the judicial and ad-
ministrative positions may have numbed the motivation for a reconsideration
of principles; inertia may have replaced continued analysis of fundamental bases.
No-action letters, for example, have done little more than clarify uncertain areas,
leaving intact the broad interpretations of "solicitation" and "offering" con-
cepts. Reconsideration at the administrative level should be directed principally
to considering the impact of the Commission's position upon small issuers and
broker-dealers, the problems of abuse which could arise if non-solicitation lim-
itations are eased, and the possible modifications to non-solicitation rules which
may satisfy both capital financing and investor protection concerns.
Absent administrative reform, modification could be accomplished through
judicial review. The courts continue to be the primary arbiters of "public
offering" interpretations under section 4(2) and are equally capable of consid-
ering the parameters of the "public interest" provisions of section 3(b).
Judicial relief may be based on a particularized finding that the Commis-
sion's non-solicitation position is beyond the scope of its authority, or is in-
consistent with statutory policy. 135 Initially, the statute should be examined. It
sets forth two factors qualifying public interest and investor protection concerns,
"the small amount involved" and "the limited character of the public offer-
ing.""" These references are in the disjunctive, thus either factor justifies an
exemption.
The statute does not expressly delineate the "amount involved" standard.
The phrase should be read, however, in light of the current statutory limit of
$5,000,000, and the legislative history reflecting four increases since 1970."' To
suggest Congress intended that all offerings up to $5,000,000 escape statutory
and administrative controls is untenable. However, it is not unreasonable to
suggest that Rule 504, governing exempt offerings up to only one-tenth of the
statutory ceiling, 3:8 imposes such substantial administrative constraints as to
defeat the legislative purpose.
Legislative reference to "the limited character of the public offering" also
135. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 152 (1976).
136. "The Commission may .. . add any class of securities to the securities exempted ...
if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter . .. is not necessary in the public interest and
for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public
offering ." S 3(b), 15 U.S.C. S 77c(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
137. See supra note 48.
138. The maximum that may be offered in any twelve-month period pursuant to a Rule 504
exemption is $500,000. 17 C.F.R. S 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1985); see supra note 52.
[Vol. XXXVIII
SECURITIES MARKETS FOR SMALL ISSUERS
challenges the scope of the SEC's position. The statutory language infers that
not all public solicitation of offerees is to be condemned. " 9 A "public offering"
of a "limited character" does not offend the statute. The SEC, however, has
adamantly restricted issuers' access to the public arena. The Commission has
relied on the "limited character" provision in establishing its non-solicitation
rules, and simultaneously has failed to give reasonable meaning to the statutory
phrase in its entirety. 40
Judicial review should not be deterred by the agency discretion argument.
The Supreme Court has very narrowly construed the Administrative Procedure
Act's exclusion from judicial review of "agency action . . . committed to agency
discretion by law."' 4' Although the SEC could have chosen to permit no ex-
ceptions under section 3(b), 42 the discretion once exercised is subject to judicial
determination that the action is consistent with delegated authority and legis-
lative policy.'" Thus, a statute providing that the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration "may grant exemptions [from the mandatory age 60
retirement rule for airline pilots] . . . if he finds that such action would be in
the public interest' ' ' 44 did not create unreviewable discretion as the agency
maintained. The court determined that it could review the discretionary action
of the Administrator against the statutory standard of public interest. 41 In the
securities field, administrative action must be measured against the expressed
legislative desire to facilitate the capital financing abilities of small businesses.4"
139. At the time of adoption of S 3(b) in 1933, the "public offering" phrase related more to
the extent of the solicitation effort rather than to the eventual Supreme Court interpretation based
upon the nature of the offerces. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
140. In SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5499, 39 Fed. Reg. 20,609 (1974), proposing
adoption of Rule 240 creating a $100,000 exemption under § 3(b), the non-solicitation provision
was justified in the following terms:
The intention of this provision is that the offers and sales generally be made through
individual contact between persons who have some knowledge of each other, or some reason
to know about each other, and not through newspapers, advertisements or other means
of general advertising. Where such means are used, it is difficult to justify an exemption
on the basis of the "limited character" of the offering.
39 Fed. Reg. at 20,610. Apparently the Commission chose not to consider circumstances other
than at the noted extremities.
141. 5 U.S.C. 5 701(a)(2) (1982). There is an apparent contradiction between § 701 of the
APA precluding judicial review of action commited to agency discretion and § 706(2)(A) listing
"abuse of discretion" as a basis for setting aside agency action. Compare id. with id. § 706(2)(A).
A discretionary act may be immune from judicial review only if "there is no law to apply." S.
REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (citing the Senate Report with approval); cf. United States
v. Winthrop Towers, 628 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1980). Even that narrow immunity from judicial
review has been criticized as unduly restrictive of the judicial role. See 5 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 28:8 (1984).
142. No exemption was established by the SEC under its § 3(b) authority until the 1956
promulgation of Regulation A. See 21 Fed. Reg. 5739 (1956); supra note 18.
143. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 106 (1946) ("All that can be required
is that the Commission's actions conform to the statutory language and policy.").
144. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (1982).
145. Rombough v. Federal Aviation Admin., 59+ F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979).
146. See supra note 48. Recent Congressional action appears, at first glance, to contradict the
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Substantial deference is ordinarily and appropriately accorded to adminis-
trative expertise. However, the validity of Rule 502(c), as applied through in-
terpretive releases, must be questioned in light of the following factors:
(i) its deviation from the judicial mandate to examine the totality of cir-
cumstances relevant to the offering;'
47
(ii) its derivation from a statutory standard not containing any policy con-
siderations similar to those found in section 3(b);' 4"
(iii) the lack of any evidentiary record supporting the adoption of the rule; '4
and
(iv) the apparent failure of the Commission to consider less restrictive al-
ternatives. I 'o
It may appear harsh to suggest the SEC has abused its discretion. That standard
of review, however, is not a pejorative reflection on the SEC, but rather a
customary affirmation of the principle that a regulation must be both reasonable
and consistent with the statute.'"'
argument that broad non-solicitation rules are contrary to legislative purpose. In the Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Congress added the 5 4(6) registration exemption to the 1933
Act but conditioned it upon non-solicitation of offerees. Pub. L. No. 96-477, S 602, 94 Stat. 2275,
2294 (amending 15 U.S.C. S 77d). The exemption, based on offers or sales solely to accredited
investors, requires that "there is no advertising or public solicitation in connection with the trans-
action by the issuer or anyone acting on the issuer's behalf." 5 4(6), 15 U.S.C. 77d(6) (1982).
The concern prompting this limitation may have been for "unsophisticated fat cats," i e. in-
experienced investors who qualify under financial standards as "accredited investors." Because S
4(6) contains no disclosure requirements, and can be used to raise up to $5,000,000, the concern
for investors expending substantial sums may have motivated the legislative provision. Rule 504,
limited to $500,000, is much more appropriate for use by small businesses; limitations on their
efforts ought to be viewed from a different perspective. The 1980 Act also added S 19(c) to the
Securities Act, stating: "It is the declared policy of this subsection that there should be greater
Federal and State cooperation in securities matters including ... (D) a substantial reduction in
costs and paperwork to diminish the burdens of raising investment capital (particularly by small
business) .... Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 5 505,
94 Stat. 2275, 2292 (amending 15 U.S.C. S 77s(c)).
147. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 119. •
148. See supra text accompanying note 56.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56; see also Warren, supra note 16, at 359-60 ("Instead
of developing new regulatory concepts through careful analysis of previous experience, the SEC
has reworked and retooled a highly criticized and fragmented exemption scheme into an equally
complex and potentially unreliable unified regulation.").
150. The term "apparent" is used because the author is not aware of any internal SEC
proposals moderating the non-solicitation rules. None of the SEC releases suggests consideration of
material changes. Rather, it appears that the historical antipathy to public solicitation has enjoyed
a position of sheltered dogma.
151. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1926) (amended IRS
regulation valid and could be applied retroactively although original regulation was inconsistent
with the statute and unreasonable). A second issue that may arise in judicial review is severability.
Although Rule 502(c) is part of a set of administrative conditions, the invalidity of one part would
not necessarily affect the remaining conditions or the exemptions. See United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968) (constitutional invalidity of one portion of Federal Kidnapping Act did not
alter the substantive reach of the statute); Moore v. Fowinkle, 512 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1975) (balance
of statute retained unless the invalid portion so essential, and so interwoven with other portions,
that it cannot be reasonably presumed the legislature intended the statute to operate otherwise than
as a whole).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Restraints on general solicitation and advertising in connection with limited
offerings enjoy both longevity and relative freedom from significant challenge.
These characteristics partially reflect the breadth of statutory definition, the force
of early administrative interpretations, and a legitimate but generalized concern
that exempt offerings may involve the dangers of "hawking" or other unde-
sirable salesmanship tactics. Thus, both the judiciary and the SEC have main-
tained an effective barrier against the erosion of non-solicitation rules. Repeated
legislative concerns for the capital-generating abilities of small businesses have
resulted in periodic revisions of registration exemptions. Yet, no material mod-
ification of the solicitation and advertising restraints, whether by definition or
interpretation, has been achieved.
Longevity is an admirable attribute if it does not create an inertia that stifles
ongoing analysis. The SEC has given its non-solicitation rules very broad ap-
plication with little evidence that investors need such extensive protection. Cur-
rent rules continue a position adopted fifty years ago during the infancy of the
1933 Act, when the reach of the securities laws was still being explored. Even
when the SEC began to develop section 3(b) exemptions, it looked to the
traditional rules, despite the fact that a different statutory provision supported
its original position. Moreover, while the manner of offering was initially one
element to be considered as part of the totality of circumstances in determining
the availability of an exemption, the Commission transformed the manner of
offering into a single and inviolable prerequisite without regard to other relevant
factors.
The private and small offering exemptions should be re-examined to de-
termine whether and to what extent they can tolerate limited forms of solicitation
and advertising. Concern for small businesses and the broker-dealers who assist
Severability issues generally arise in cases of statutory construction, but the principles developed
should be applicable to the analogous process of administrative review. Provisions regarding in-
tegration of offerings (Rule 502(a)), information requirements (Rule 502(b)), limitations on resale
(Rule 502(d)), and the numerical limitations in Rules 505 and 506 are not dependent upon or
functionally linked to the non-solicitation provisions of Rule 502(c). That portion of the rule could
be eliminated without affecting the continued viability of the other Regulation D provisions, par-
ticularly if modified conditions on solicitation and advertising were continued. Alternatively, a court
concerned with the issue of severability, or with the setting of more appropriate bounds for non-
solicitation provisions, might keep the rule in effect on a short-term basis pending review by the
SEC of rule revisions. That procedure was used in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,910 (D.D.C. 1974). The court,
uncertain whether the SEC had acted in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. SS 4321-4370 (1982), but finding that the SEC had in any event acted improperly under
rulemaking procedures, kept the rules as promulgated in existence pending remand to the SEC
for further rulemaking consideration. A similar procedure was utilized in Addison v. Holly Hill
Fruit Co., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), where a portion of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division's regulation dealing with area of coverage was found to be inconsistent with the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Rather than declare the entire regulation invalid, the case was remanded to
the district court "to hold it until the Administrator, by making a valid determination of the area
with all deliberate speed, acts within the authority given him by Congress." 322 U.S. at 619. The
Court noted, and was prepared to accept, the retroactive application that would ensue from the
revised regulation. Id. at 620.
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them will not be materially alleviated until issuers and their representatives are
able to utilize a broader base of potential investors than the rules currently
permit. Considerable room exists for modification of restraints without gener-
ating fears of uncontrolled and deceptive solicitations. The SEC provides the
preferable forum for developing alternatives. However, in the absence of ad-
ministrative reform, the judiciary can play a significant role by reinterpreting
the section 4(2) "offering" concept and by reviewing the administrative re-
strictions in light of the legislative purpose expressed in the section 3(b) ex-
emption provisions.
